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There was once a time when white 'expert' social
scientists could go to a developing country,
analyse a problem, produce a set of recommenda-
tions, and return to base with a clear conscience
feeling that their job was done. If 'politics' re-
sulted in the non-acceptance or non-implementa-
tion of their recommendations, then so be it. Such
practices are still not uncommon. But if today the
expert is rash enough to talk about his mission
at the IDS or some similar institution, he is likely
to be forced to justify his work politically. That
is to say, he is expected to produce an analysis
of the political structure of the country in ques-
tion, and to explain which political interests will
benefit from, and therefore support, his recom-
mendations. His work as an adviser is judged not
only by his technical competence, but in the light
of his ability to tailor and present recommenda-
tions in such a way that they will gain the support
of powerful political interests, or at least help
arouse the un-politicised poor. The adviser who
simply argues that policies A and B will be good
for country C is considered to have done only
half a job, and likely to be characterised (or
caricatured) as naïve.
Such a trend is on the whole refreshing; it has
the merit of making explicit the political nature
of advisory work, and makes for more interesting
seminars. The technical specialist, especially the
economist, is forced to look beyond the disciplin-
ary boundaries of his technical specialism. The
question to which this paper addresses itself is
whether the wholesale invasion of the field of
political analysis by non-p olitical-scientists-
especially economistsalways produces sensible
or useful political analyses.
It seems to this author that the combined forces
of the politically-awakening economists and the
politically-awakened neo-Marxists tend to con-
fine discussions within the limits of a model of
the political process which is rather too narrow to
be accepted even as a necessary over-simplifica-
tion of the world. One might call this the 'power-
interest' model: policy is to be understood
primarily as the expression of the interests of
socio-economic groups and categories which exert
leverage at some stage in the political process.
Thusand may my colleagues pardon meso
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many of our discussions fall into a repetitive
pattern: the first speaker explains why country X
should adopt such and such a policy; the second
speaker explains why that is impossible because
it conflicts with the interests of groups A and B.
Later speakers go on to discuss the feasibility
of alternative policies or alternative political
alliances, but always within the confines of the
model which directly links group interests to
policy.
Professional political scientists of course find the
'power-interest model'and the present author's
discussion of itabsurdly elementary. They are
able to tell us a great deal more about how
political institutions actually work. This author
does not intend to re-work old ground, but rather
to examine the general issue from a rather
different vantage point, and to focus on how
'bureaucrats'the actual agents and often the
instigators of government policyappear to per-
ceive policy options. The conclusion to which this
paper points is that, at least in certain spheres,
the connection between interest and policy is far
from direct, but is mediated by the particular
perceptions of those in administration about the
range of measures which are feasible in respect
of rural development. In other words, a great
deal never gets done not (just) because it conflicts
with powerful interests, but because it is simply
never considered.
Rural development and 'programmatism'
A vantage point for examining the question of
bureaucrats' perceptions of policy options was
provided by attending within a relatively short
space of time two conferences on rural develop-
ment held in two developing countries situated
in different continents. The precise character of
these conferences is important to the argument
which follows. Both were concerned with rural
development in the respective countries, and
organised by local university staff. In both cases
the overt concern was practicali.e. with the
formulation of policy recommendations; a cer-
tain amount of political backing had been given.
Most important, the majority of participants were
not academics, but regular staff of local
Ministries of Agriculture and related government
agenciesdepartments of co-operatives, irriga-
tion, and rural development, rural banks, regional
development authorities, etc. The numerical pre-
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dominance of these bureaucrats' exerted a major
influence on the tone and content of papers and
discussions. Debate was relatively uninhibited
and points of conflict between departments often
given an airing. Few expatriates were present in
either case. One assumes that, since many of the
bureaucrats were sacrificing weekends and work-
ing time to attend the conferences, they tended to
be those whose concern about rural development
was the most genuine. In sum, the situations
were such that one could obtain a fairly good
insight into how the bureaucrats perceived the
issues in rural development.
This author was struck not so much by the
specific content of the discussions as by the re-
markable identity of outlook which was exhibited
by the two sets of bureaucrats. This outlook was
characterised by a rather narrow and rigid view
of what represented the permissible/possible
range of government activities to promote rural
development. In particular, one was left with an
overwhelming impression of 'programmatism',
i.e. a view that the only way to tackle 'problems'
is to run 'programmes'departments must be
allotted responsibility, staff appointed, the
problem defined and categorised, and sets of
prescribed services provided. These services may
include: supplying fertilisers; building 'growth
poles' with ready-made dispensaries, garages,
lorry-parks, local government offices, schools and
football pitches; transporting and supplying
spare parts for tractors or outboard motors;
regulating tractor hire charges; supplying certified
seed; establishing and supervising co-operative
credit facilities; building irrigation dams and
improving marketing systems. Provided that the
public, politicians and other government depart-
ments pull their weight, there is nothing that
cannot be provided!
The excluded alternatives
That government departments should display
eagerness to provide more services to the public
is in itself very laudable. The trouble lies in the
alternatives which a 'program matist' world-view
appears to preclude. Specifically, it appears to
preclude serious consideration of two broad
alternative kinds of government intervention in
the rural sector: on the one (right?) hand, the
use of price policy to channel resources into
desired activitiesand this in countries where
government control over prices ranges from 'sub-
stantial' to 'near complete'; on the other (left?)
hand, what might broadly be called 'mobilization
strategies', i.e. government stimulation of a broad
range of self-help and communal labour schemes.
2 A book on the subject of 'urban bias', by my colleague,1 The word 'bureaucrat' is used entirely non-pejoratively. Michael Lipton, is due to be published in 1976.
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The latter might cover adult education; dis-
semination and discussion of technical advice in
agricultural production; health and hygiene, con-
struction of local infrastructure in the form of
roads, bridges, drainage ditches, small-scale
dams and dispensaries; and co-operative process-
ing and marketing of output; or local initiative
in the formulation of development projects.
In the context of these two conferences, the evi-
dence for the prevalence of 'programmatist'
ideologies is not of a kind which would satisfy a
court of justice. It lies less in what was said than
in what was left unsaid or ignored. For example,
occasional attempts (by economists) to introduce
the concepts of prices, incentives and efficient re-
source use were largely stifled in a mixture of dis-
interest and apparent non-comprehension.
Attempts to discuss 'mobilization strategies' were
by implicit consensus referred to officials of
cooperative departments, and diverted into dis-
cussions of the reasons for the malfunctioning of
cooperatives. Real interest was sparked largely by
issues which could be played out on the 'admin-
instrative chess board'. Should there be a three-
or four-tier structure of local government?
Should extension be crop-specific or integrated?
What should be the qualifications for directors of
regional development authorities? Should the
rural offices of all government agencies be
grouped together in one place? In general, 'pro-
grammatism' warms to discussions in which the
public can be ignored or simply seen as so many
pawns. It shies away when the public starts doing
something untutored, regardless of whether that
something be increasing the output of coconuts
because of an increase in the market price, or
cooperating with neighbours in establishing an
informal mutual credit scheme.
Before saying anything in detail about the pos-
sible reasons for the prevalence of 'program-
matist' ideologies, let us examine its consequences.
One might be tempted to dismiss the whole issue
as something rather peripheral were its main con-
sequences limited to marginal choices about
roughly equivalent sets of policies. But that, un-
fortunately, does not seem to be the case. Let
us look at the issue of rural-urban relationships
and, specifically, the theory of 'urban bias'2. It is
clear that one of the ways in which many
developing countriesincluding the two con-
sidered heretransfer income from rural to
urban sectors is by maintaining an over-valued
exchange rate. This in general favours the sector
which uses most importsi.e. the urban-indus-
trial sectorand specifically encourages the im-
port of food, thus depressing food prices and the
incomes of the rural population. At the same
time, an over-valued exchange rate 'relieves' local
producers of agricultural export commodities of
a proportion of the world market value of their
produce. Both countries in question have been
able to maintain grossly over-valued exchange
rates because a large proportion of their rural
populations and resources are 'locked into' a
situation of dependence on receipts from tree-
crop exports. In the medium-term, the rural
producers can do little except accept the prices
offered and invest their energies and financial
surpluses in other activities.
While the prevalence of 'urban bias' in these and
other developing countries may be due largely to
the play of political interests, another important
aspect of the problem is that the government de-
partments which ought normally to protect rural
interests are staffed by people whose perceptions
of policy-making make them ill-fitted to defend
rural interests over the really big decisions. Be-
cause bureaucrats do not appear to conceive of
the ordinary farmer as an economic animal, and
because they can conceive of helping the rural
population only via their own programmes, they
do not discuss rural development in terms of
prices, incentives and resource allocation; they
are in many cases apparently not even aware that
decisions about, for example, the exchange rate,
may have more effect on rural output and welfare
than all the efforts of the extension, irrigation
and cooperative services put together.
The 'logic of bureaucracy'?
There are few people who are willing to forgo
the pleasures of complaining about both 'bureau-
cracy' in the pejorative sensei.e. 'red tape', un-
necessary obstruction and complicationand
'bureaucracy' in the sociological sensei.e.
routinised administration, characterised by formal
procedure, de-personalization, hierarchy, precise
specification of job functions and very limited
and prescribed scope for discretion about the
application of rules. Most of us are quick to
detect and complain of bureaucracy (in either
sense) in organisations other than our own. 'Pro-
grammatism' is clearly in some sense a character-
istic of bureaucracies, and an excess of bureau-
cracy has often been diagnosed as a major cause
or symptom of the under-development of ex-
colonial societies. Is there then anything novel
in the present author's argument? The answer to
that question depends on the closeness of the
necessary connection between bureaucratic
modes of administration and the phenomenon of
'programmatism'. That there is a certain degree
of necessary connection cannot be doubted:
bureaucracies by nature tend to favour routin-
ised rather than innovative activities, are best
fitted for control, and tend to disaggregate and
simplify total situations in ways which make
easier the application of standard rules, but
militate against a comprehension of the situa-
tion. These characteristics clearly favour the
development of an ideology similar to that of
programmatism. In particular, they make it
especially difficult to pursue 'mobilization
strategies' of the kind outlined above. However,
it is far from clear that the imperatives of
bureaucratic organisations can fully account for
programmatist ideologies. The imperatives of
bureaucratic organisation may determine how a
bureaucracy will set about achieving a stated
goal; they do not seem to explain why the parti-
cular bureaucracies in question should be so pos-
sessive in their desire to accomplish all goals
through their own programmes, and so unin-
terested in the possibility of alternative means to
the same ends. Many bureaucracies function
happily in societies in which a substantial propor-
tion of decisions about resource allocation are
taken through the market mechanism. There is
no 'iron law' of the expansion of the sphere of
operations of government bureaucracies.
Class interest?
The prevalence of 'programmatism' would then
seem to require some independent explanation.
One possible explanation which will occur to
many, and which certainly contains part of the
truth, would perhaps lie in the argument that the
interests of bureaucratswhatever the ministry
they belong toare the interests of the urban
middle class. That is, the actions, and ideologies
of bureaucrats are largely an expression of a
class interest. Low food prices suit the Ministry
of Agriculture, if not agriculture. The Coopera-
tive Department shows no interest in 'mobiliza-
tion' because that would endanger its political
control of the rural population. Such arguments
have an appeal, but there are too many unex-
plained exceptions. If the Cooperative Depart-
ment is primarily interested in political control,
why is it happy to ignore the existence, in one
small region in which one of our conferences was
held, of several dozen totally informal but suc-
cessful small-scale sugar production coopera-
tives? At another level, why, in a world in which
it is feared that political power will accrue to the
holders of food surpluses, do food-deficit govern-
ments not achieve independence of this threat by
taking more vigorous steps to achieve food self-
3 Cf. Bernard Schaffer, "The Deadlock in Development
Administration" in C. Leys (cd.), Politics and Change in
Developing Countries, Cambridge University Press, 1976.
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sufficiency? Even when analyses of rural develop-
ment policies purely in terms of political interests
manage to free themselves of tautology, they
still seem to leave some questions open.
Life styles and intellectual frameworks
A further partial understanding of 'programmat-
ism' may be found in looking at the socio-
economic characteristics of the two countries
concerned: relative to other countries in their
respective regions, each has a lengthy history of
relative affluence based on the export of one
primary agricultural commodity; each has a rich
and Anglicised élite, and attained early independ-
ence from the colonial power with relatively little
effort. It may be that the life styles and ideologies
of these élites have exerted a baneful influence
on administrative capacity, particularly where this
demands some empathy or contact with the rural
population. In this connection, it seems important
that we are talking of officials concerned with
rural development: 'programmatism' may be less
in evidence in areas of government activity where
the social and cultural gap between officials and
clients is less wide.
Finally, and by way of a conclusion, a word
about the way in which 'programmatism' appears
to find justification in the transfer of 'intellectual
technology'. In one of his early exercises in
castigating the United Nations, and especially its
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alleged domination by the Third World, the
former US Ambassador (to the UN) Daniel
Moynihan, asserted that the developing countries
and thus the UNwere ridden with ideologies,
stemming directly from British Fabianism, whichjustified and encouraged a rather drab form of
interventionist state capitalism. Pardoning the
exaggeration, this claim appears to contain a
certain truth. Many people in responsible posi-
tions in the developing world, along with this
author and many current students, were taught
by left-wing lecturers that the British/American
development experiences are poor models for
developing countries, and that objective condi-
tions within the latter and within the world
economy are such as to necessitate large-scale
state economic intervention. For a variety of
reasonsprobably few of which are related to
the content of student lecturesextensive govern-
ment economic intervention is the rule in almost
all developing countries, whatever their political
complexion. It is unfortunate that attempts to
debate the nature and content of that interven-
ion are sometimes interpreted simply as argu-
ments for laisser-faire and 'rebutted' with the
words of lecturers who, in many cases, have since
learned that the pillars of North European social
democracy often change shape under the stress of
tropical climate.
